The ability to exchange secret information is critical to many commercial, governmental, and military networks. The intrinsically secure communications graph (iS-graph) is a random graph which describes the connections that can be securely established over a large-scale network, by exploiting the physical properties of the wireless medium. This paper aims to characterize the global properties of the iS -graph in terms of 1) percolation on the infinite plane, and 2) full connectivity on a finite region. First, for the Poisson iS -graph defined on the infinite plane, the existence of a phase transition is proven, whereby an unbounded component of connected nodes suddenly arises as the density of legitimate nodes is increased. This shows that long-range secure communication is still possible in the presence of eavesdroppers. Second, full connectivity on a finite region of the Poisson iS -graph is considered. The exact asymptotic behavior of full connectivity in the limit of a large density of legitimate nodes is characterized. Then, simple, explicit expressions are derived in order to closely approximate the probability of full connectivity for a finite density of legitimate nodes. These results help clarify how the presence of eavesdroppers can compromise long-range secure communication.
The basis for information-theoretic security, which builds on the notion of perfect secrecy [1] , was laid in [2] and later in [3] and [4] . More recently, there has been a renewed interest in information-theoretic security over wireless channels, from the perspective of space-time communications [5] , multiple-input multiple-output communications [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] , eavesdropper collusion [11] , [12] , cooperative relay networks [13] , fading channels [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] , strong secrecy [19] , [20] , secret key agreement [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] , code design [26] [27] [28] , among other topics. A fundamental limitation of this literature is that it only considers scenarios with a small number of nodes. To account for large-scale networks composed of multiple legitimate and eavesdropper nodes, secrecy graphs were first introduced in [29] from a geometrical perspective, and in [30] from an information-theoretic perspective. The local connectivity of secrecy graphs was extensively characterized in [31] , [32] , while the scaling laws of the secrecy capacity were presented in [33] and [34] .
Percolation theory studies the existence of phase transitions in random graphs, whereby an infinite cluster of connected nodes suddenly arises as some system parameter is varied. Various percolation models have been considered in the literature. The Poisson Boolean model was introduced in [35] , which derived the first bounds on the critical density, and started the field of continuum percolation. The Poisson random connection model was introduced and analyzed in [36] . The Poisson nearest neighbor model was considered in [37] . The signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) model was characterized in [38] . A comprehensive study of the various models and results in continuum percolation can be found in [39] .
The connectivity of large but finite networks has also received attention in the literature. The asymptotic behavior of partial connectivity of the Poisson Boolean model restricted to a finite box was studied in [40] . The asymptotic full connectivity of the same model was analyzed in [41] and [42] , which obtained the rate of growth of the radius that ensures full connectivity. The asymptotic full connectivity in finite nearest neighbor networks was considered in [43] and [44] .
In this paper, we characterize long-range secure connectivity in wireless networks by considering the intrinsically secure communications graph ( -graph). The -graph describes the connections that can be established with information-theoretic security over a large-scale network. While in [31] and [32] , we characterized the local (i.e., single-hop) properties of the -graph, including the degrees and maximum rate of a typical node with respect to its neighbors, here we focus on the global (i.e., multihop) properties of the -graph. The main contributions of this paper are as follows.
1) Percolation in the -graph: We prove the existence of a phase transition in the Poisson -graph defined on the 0018-9448/$31.00 © 2012 IEEE  TABLE I  NOTATION AND SYMBOLS infinite plane, whereby an unbounded component of connected nodes suddenly arises as we increase the density of legitimate nodes. This shows that long-range communication is still possible in a wireless network when a secrecy constraint is present. 2) Full connectivity in the -graph: We analyze secure full connectivity on a finite region of the Poisson -graph. We characterize the exact asymptotic behavior of full connectivity in the limit of a large density of legitimate nodes. Then, we obtain simple, explicit expressions that closely approximate the probability of full connectivity for a finite density of legitimate nodes. This paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the system model. Section III characterizes continuum percolation in the Poisson -graph. Section IV analyzes full connectivity in the Poisson -graph. Section V concludes the paper and summarizes important findings.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We start by describing our system model and defining our measures of secrecy. The notation and symbols are summarized in Table I , at the top of the page.
A. Wireless Propagation Characteristics
Given a transmitter node and a receiver node , we model the received power associated with the wireless link as (1) where is the transmit power, and is the power gain of the link . The gain is considered constant (quasistatic) throughout the use of the communications channel, corresponding to channels with a large coherence time. Furthermore, the function is assumed to satisfy the following conditions, which are typically observed in practice: 1) depends on and only through the link length ; 2 2) is continuous and strictly decreasing with ; and 3) . 2 With abuse of notation, we can write g(r)=g(x ; x )j .
B. -Graph
Consider a wireless network where the legitimate nodes and the potential eavesdroppers are randomly scattered in space, according to some point processes. The -graph is a convenient representation of the links that can be established with information-theoretic security on such network. In the following, we introduce a precise definition of the -graph, based on the notion of strong secrecy. [31] ): Let denote the set of legitimate nodes, and denote the set of eavesdroppers. The -graph is the directed graph with vertex set and edge set (2) where is a threshold representing the prescribed infimum secrecy rate for each communication link; and is the maximum secrecy rate (MSR) of the link , given by (3) in bits per complex dimension, where ; , are the noise powers of the legitimate users and eavesdroppers, respectively, and . 3 This definition presupposes that the eavesdroppers are not allowed to collude (i.e., they cannot exchange or combine information), and therefore, only the eavesdropper with the strongest received signal from determines the MSR between and . The effect of eavesdropper collusion on the local connectivity of the -graph is analyzed in [32] .
Definition 2.1 ( -Graph
In the remainder of this paper, we consider that the noise powers of the legitimate users and eavesdroppers are equal, i.e., . In such case, we can combine (1)-(3) to obtain the following edge set: where is the eavesdropper closest to the transmitter . Note that the particular case of corresponds to considering the existence of secure links, in the sense that an edge is present iff . In such case, the edge set in (4) simplifies to (5) which corresponds to the geometrical model proposed in [29] . Fig. 1 (a) shows an example of such an -graph on .
The spatial location of the legitimate and eavesdropper nodes can be modeled either deterministically or stochastically. In many cases, the node positions are unknown to the network designer a priori, so they may be treated as uniformly random according to a Poisson point process [45] [46] [47] .
Definition 2.2 (Poisson -Graph):
The Poisson -graph is an -graph where , are mutually independent, homogeneous Poisson point processes with densities and , respectively.
In the remainder of this paper (unless otherwise indicated), we focus on Poisson -graphs in .
III. PERCOLATION IN THE POISSON -GRAPH
Percolation theory studies the behavior of the connected components in random graphs. Typically, a continuum percolation model consists of an underlying point process defined on the infinite plane, and a rule that describes how connections are established between the nodes [39] . A main property of all percolation models is that they exhibit a phase transition as some parameter is varied. If this parameter is the density of nodes, then the phase transition occurs at some critical density . When , denoted as the subcritical phase, all the clusters are a.s. bounded. 4 When , denoted as the supercritical phase, the graph exhibits a.s. an unbounded cluster of nodes, or in other words, the graph percolates.
Percolation theory plays an important role in the study of connectivity in multihop wireless networks, where the formation of an infinite component of connected nodes is desirable for communication over arbitrarily long distances. In the literature, percolation-and therefore long-range communication-were shown to occur in various important models, including the Boolean model [35] , the random connection model [36] , the nearest neighbor model [37] , and the SINR model [38] .
In this section, we focus on the -graph model, and show that long-range communication with information-theoretic security is feasible in the presence of eavesdroppers. The mathematical characterization of the -graph presents two challenges: 1) the -graph is a directed graph, which leads to the study of directed percolation; and 2) the -graph exhibits dependences between the state of different edges, which leads to the study of dependent percolation. We start by introducing some definitions, then present and prove the main theorem, and finally illustrate the percolation phenomenon with various simulation results.
A. Definitions
Graphs: As before, we use to denote the (directed) -graph with vertex set and edge set given in (2) . In addition, we define two undirected graphs: the weak -graph , where and the strong -graph , where
The graph represents the links where secure unidirectional communication is possible with an MSR greater than . The graph , on the other hand, represents the links where secure bidirectional communication is possible with an MSR greater than . The various types of -graphs are illustrated in Fig. 1 .
Graph Components: While the notion of "component" is unambiguous in undirected graphs, some subtleties arise in directed graphs. Specifically, the notion of component is not clear in a directed graph, because even if node can reach node through a sequence of directed edges, it does not imply can reach . We can, however, generalize the notion of component associated with undirected graphs by defining four different graph components for the -graph.
We use the notation to represent a path from node to node in a directed graph , and -to represent a path between node and node in an undirected graph . We define four components (6)
From these definitions, it is clear that for a given realization of and , the following properties hold for any : 5 (10)
Percolation Probabilities: To study the percolation in the -graph, it is useful to define percolation probabilities associated with the four graph components. Specifically, let , , , and , respectively, be the probabilities that the in, out, weak, and strong components containing node have an infinite number of nodes, i.e. 6 where . 7 Our goal is to study the properties and behavior of these percolation probabilities.
B. Main Result
We now investigate the percolation phenomenon in the -graph. Specifically, we prove the existence of a phase transition in the -graph, whereby an unbounded component of securely connected nodes suddenly arises as we increase the density of legitimate nodes. 8 The result is given by the following main theorem. 
there exist critical densities , , , and satisfying (13) (14) such that (15) 5 In the literature, the weak and strong components of node x are sometimes defined differently as K (x)=fy 2 5 : 9 x ! y _ 9 y ! xg=K (x) [ K (x) and K (x)=fy 2 5 : 9 x ! y^9 y ! xg = K (x) \ K (x):
In this paper, we prefer the definitions in (8) and (9) , since they only depend on the respective undirected graphs G and G , and do not require explicit knowledge of G. As we shall see, this choice will simplify many of the derivations, namely by allowing us to translate an analysis of directed graphs into one of undirected graphs. 6 We condition on the event that a legitimate node is located at x = 0. According to Slivnyak's theorem [48, Sec. 4.4] , apart from the given point at x = 0, the probabilistic structure of the conditioned process is identical to that of the original process. 7 Except where otherwise indicated, in the rest of this paper we use the symbol 5 to represent the out, in, weak, or strong component. 8 Note that the existence of a phase transition was previously conjectured in [29] , for the case of % = 0.
for any . Conversely, if , then for any , . To prove the theorem, we introduce the following three lemmas.
Lemma 3.1: For any
and satisfying (12) , there exists an such that for all . Proof: Due to its length, the proof is postponed to Section III-C.
Lemma 3.2: For any
and satisfying (12) , there exists a such that for all . Proof: Due to its length, the proof is postponed to Section III-D. . The MSR of a link , given in (3), is upper bounded by the channel capacity of a link with zero length, i.e., . If the threshold is set such that , the condition in (2) for the existence of the edge is never satisfied by any , . Thus, the -graph has no edges and cannot percolate. We now consider the case of . From properties (10) and (11), we have and . Then, Lemmas 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 imply that each curve departs from the zero value at some critical density , as expressed by (15) and (16) . Furthermore, these critical densities are nontrivial in the sense that . The ordering of critical densities in (13) and (14) follows from similar coupling arguments.
We now present some remarks on Theorem 3.1. The theorem shows that each of the four components of the -graph experiences a phase transition at some critical density . As we increase the density of legitimate nodes, the component percolates first, then or , and finally . Furthermore, percolation can occur for any prescribed infimum secrecy rate , as long as it is below the channel capacity of a link with zero length, i.e., . This has different implications depending on the type of propagation function . 1) If , percolation can occur for any arbitrarily large secrecy requirement , as long as the density of legitimate nodes is made large enough.
2) If
, percolation cannot occur if the threshold is set above , where . To ensure percolation for such , the must be increased until decreases below the desired . At that point, the density can then be increased to achieve percolation. Note that the theorem holds for any channel gain function satisfying Conditions 1-3 in Section II-A, including bounded and unbounded models. Concerning the density of eavesdroppers, the theorem says that as long as , percolation can occur even in scenarios with arbitrarily dense eavesdroppers. This can be achieved by just deploying more legitimate nodes, so that is large enough. Operationally, the theorem is important because it shows that long-range secure communication over multiple hops is still feasible, even in the presence of arbitrarily dense eavesdroppers. In particular, if we limit communication to the secure links whose MSR exceeds (chosen such that ), then for large enough, a component with an infinite number of securely connected nodes arises. Those nodes are able to communicate with strong secrecy at a rate greater than bits per complex channel use. The specific type of the secure connection (e.g., unidirectional or bidirectional) depends on the graph component under consideration: out, in, weak, or strong component.
C. Proof of Lemma 3.1
In this proof, it is sufficient to show that does not percolate for sufficiently small in the case of , since for larger the connectivity is worse and certainly does not percolate either. 9 We then proceed in two intermediate steps.
First, we map the continuous -graph onto a discrete hexagonal lattice , and declare a face in to be closed in such a way that the absence of face percolation in implies the absence of continuum percolation in . Second, we show that discrete face percolation does not occur in for sufficiently small (but nonzero) .
Mapping on a Lattice: We start with some definitions. Let be a hexagonal lattice as depicted in Fig. 2(a) , where each face is a regular hexagon with side length . Each face has a state, which can be either open or closed. A set of faces (e.g., a path or a circuit) in is said to be open iff all the faces that form the set are open. We now define when a face is closed based on how the processes and behave inside that face. 9 A simple coupling argument shows that the percolation probabilities p ( ; ; %) are nonincreasing functions of %.
Definition 3.1 (Closed Face in ):
A face in is said to be closed iff all the following conditions are met: 1) Each of the six equilateral triangles that compose the hexagon has at least one eavesdropper.
2) The hexagon is free of legitimate nodes. The aforementioned definition was chosen such that discrete face percolation in can be tied to continuum percolation in , as given by the following proposition. Proof: Assume there is a closed circuit in surrounding the origin, as depicted in Fig. 2(b) . This implies that the open component in containing 0, denoted by , must be finite. Since the area of the region is finite, the continuous graph has a finite number of vertices falling inside this region. Thus, to prove that is finite, we just need to show that no edges of cross the circuit . Consider Fig. 2(a) , and suppose that the shaded faces are part of the closed circuit . Let , be two legitimate nodes such that falls on an open face on the inner side of , while falls on the outer side of (note that Definition 3.1 specifies that the closed faces in cannot contain legitimate nodes). Clearly, the most favorable situation for , being able to establish an edge across is the one depicted in Fig. 2(a) . The edge exists in iff either or are free of eavesdroppers. 10 This condition does not hold, since Definition 3.1 guarantees that at least one eavesdropper is located inside the triangle . Thus, no edges of cross the circuit , which implies that has finite size. 
1) Discrete Percolation:
Having performed an appropriate mapping from a continuous to a discrete model, we now analyze discrete face percolation in .
Proposition 3.2 (Discrete Percolation in ):
If the parameters , , satisfy (17) then the origin is a.s. surrounded by a closed circuit in .
Proof: The model introduced in Section III-C1 can be seen as a face percolation model on the hexagonal lattice , where each face is closed independently of other faces with probability (18) Face percolation on the hexagonal lattice can be equivalently described as site percolation on the triangular lattice. In particular, recall that if (19) then the open component in containing the origin is a.s. finite [49, Ch. 5, Th. 8] , and so the origin is a.s. surrounded by a closed circuit in . Combining (18) and (19), we obtain (17) .
We now use the propositions to finalize the proof of Lemma 3.1, whereby for sufficiently small (but nonzero) .
2) Proof of Lemma 3.1: For any fixed , it is easy to see that condition (17) can always be met by making the hexagon side large enough, and the density small enough (but nonzero). For any such choice of parameters , , satisfying (17), the origin is a.s. surrounded by a closed circuit in (by Proposition 3.2), and the component is a.s. finite (by Proposition 3.1), i.e., .
D. Proof of Lemma 3.2
We proceed in two intermediate steps. First, we associate with our continuous -graph a discrete square lattice as well as its dual , and declare an edge in to be open in such a way that discrete edge percolation in implies continuum percolation in . Second, we show that discrete edge percolation occurs in for sufficiently large (but finite) . 1) Mapping on a Lattice: We start with some definitions. Let be a square lattice with edge length . Let be the dual lattice of , depicted in Fig. 3(a) . We make the origin of the coordinate system coincide with a vertex of . Each edge has a state, which can be either open or closed. We declare an edge of to be open iff its dual edge in is open. Furthermore, a set of edges (e.g., a path or a circuit) in or is said to be open iff all the edges that form the set are open.
We now specify when an edge of (and therefore of ) is open based on how the processes and behave in the neighborhood of that edge. Consider Fig. 3(b) , where denotes an edge in , and and denote the two squares adjacent to . Let denote the four vertices of the rectangle . We then have the following definition. 1) Each square and adjacent to has at least one legitimate node.
2) The region is free of eavesdroppers, where is smallest rectangle such that with 11 (20) The aforementioned definition was chosen such that discrete edge percolation in can be tied to continuum percolation in , as given by the following two propositions. Proof: If two legitimate nodes , are to be placed inside the region , the most unfavorable configuration in terms of MSR is the one where the distance is maximized, i.e., , are on opposite corners of the rectangle and thus . In such configuration, we see from (4) 2) Discrete Percolation: Having performed an appropriate mapping from a continuous to a discrete model, we now analyze discrete edge percolation in . Let be the number of squares that compose the rectangle introduced in Definition 3.2. We first study the behavior of paths in with the following proposition.
Proposition 3.5 (Geometric Bound):
The probability that a given path of with length is closed is bounded by (21) 11 To ensure that r in (20) is well defined, in the rest of this paper we assume that d is chosen such that d < g
where is a finite integer and (22) is the probability that an edge of is closed. Proof: (Outline): Using Definition 3.2, we can write Now, let denote a path in with length and edges . Even though the edges do not all have independent states (in which case we would have ), it is possible to show that for a finite integer , by finding a subset of edges with independent states (see [38] and [50] for various examples).
Having obtained a geometric bound on the probability of a path of length being closed, we can now use a Peierls argument to study the existence of an infinite component. 12 surrounding 0. This is best seen by inspecting Fig. 3(c) , where the origin is surrounded by a necklace of closed edges in , which block all possible routes in from the origin to infinity. Thus, the inequality in (24) is equivalent to . Let denote the possible number of circuits of length in surrounding 0 (a deterministic quantity). Let denote the number of closed circuits of length in surrounding 0 (a random variable). From combinatorial arguments, it can be shown [52, eq. (1.17)] that . Then, for a fixed where we used the union bound and Proposition 3.5. Also (25) for . We see that if satisfies (23), then (25) is strictly less than one, and (24) follows. We now use the propositions to finalize the proof of Lemma 3.2, whereby for sufficiently large (but finite) .
3) Proof of Lemma 3.2: For any fixed , it is easy to see that the probability in (22) can be made small enough to satisfy condition (23), by making the edge length sufficiently small, and the density sufficiently large (but finite). For any such choice of parameters , , satisfying (23) , the open component in containing 0 is infinite with positive probability (by Proposition 3.6), and the component is also infinite with positive probability (by Proposition 3.4), i.e., .
E. Simulation Results
In this section, we obtain additional insights about percolation in the -graph via Monte Carlo simulation. Specifically, we aim to evaluate the percolation probabilities as a function of the density of legitimate nodes, and thus estimate the corresponding critical densities .
In our simulation procedure, we consider a square with dimensions . The area is adjusted according to , where the average number of legitimate nodes in is kept fixed. We use nodes and . We first place legitimate nodes and legitimate nodes inside , uniformly and independently. 13 The -graph is then established using as edge set (26) where , and is a toroidal distance metric [53] , [54] used to reduce boundary effects. We then determine the various components in , , and , and directly compute each percolation probability as the covered fraction of the corresponding unbounded cluster. 14 13 We use P() to denote a discrete Poisson distribution with mean .
14 We consider that a component is unbounded when it contains a loop around the torus, in any direction. 4 shows the simulated percolation probabilities for the weak and strong components of the -graph, versus the density of legitimate nodes. It considers the simplest case of , for which the percolation probabilities depend only on the ratio . As predicted by Theorem 3.1, the curves and steeply depart from zero as the density is increased, suggesting that and , for the case of and . Operationally, this means that if long-range bidirectional secure communication is desired in a wireless network, the density of legitimate nodes must be at least 5.2 times that of the eavesdroppers. In practice, this ratio must be even larger, because a security requirement greater than is typically required. 15 Furthermore, increasing also leads to an increased average fraction of nodes which belong to the infinite component, thus ensuring better connectivity of the network. Fig. 5 illustrates the dependence of the percolation probability on the secrecy rate threshold . As expected, we observe that the critical density is increasing with respect to . This is because as we increase the threshold , the requirement for any two nodes , to be securely connected becomes stricter. Thus, the connectivity of the -graph becomes worse and a higher density of legitimate nodes is needed for percolation. Fig. 6 illustrates the subcritical and supercritical phases of the -graph. In Fig. 6(a) , we have , and the -graph exhibits only small, bounded clusters of legitimate nodes. This is in agreement with Fig. 6(b) , which suggests that for a ratio of , all four out, in, weak, and strong components are subcritical. In Fig. 6(b) , we have , and the -graph exhibits a large cluster of connected nodes. This also agrees with Fig. 4 , which suggests that for a ratio of , all four components are supercritical.
IV. FULL CONNECTIVITY IN THE POISSON -GRAPH
In the previous sections, we studied percolation in the -graph defined over the infinite plane. We showed that for 15 The critical densities ( ; %) are nondecreasing functions of and %, as can be shown using a coupling argument similar to the proof of Lemma 3.3. some combinations of the parameters , the regime is supercritical and an infinite component arises. However, the existence of an infinite component does not ensure connectivity between any two nodes, and in this sense percolation ensures only partial connectivity of the network. In some scenarios, it is of interest to guarantee full connectivity, i.e., that all nodes can communicate with each other, possibly through multiple hops. Note, however, that for networks defined over an infinite region, the probability of full connectivity is exactly zero. Thus, to study of full connectivity, we need to restrict our attention to a finite region .
Throughout this section, we consider the simplest case of , i.e., the existence of secure links with a positive (but possibly small) MSR. Because this scenario is characterized by the simple geometric description in (5) , it provides various insights that are useful in understanding more complex scenarios. 16 Furthermore, the case of represents the most favorable scenario in terms of full connectivity, since a higher security requirement leads to degraded connectivity.
In what follows, we start by defining full connectivity in the -graph. We then characterize the exact asymptotic behavior of full connectivity in the limit of a large density of legitimate nodes. Finally, we derive simple, explicit expressions that closely approximate the probability of full in-and out-connectivity for a finite density of legitimate nodes, and determine the accuracy of such approximations using simulations.
A. Definitions
Since the -graph is a directed graph, we start by distinguishing between full out-and in-connectivity with the following definitions.
Definition 4.1 (Full Out-Connectivity): A legitimate node
is fully out-connected with respect to a region if in the -graph there exists a directed path from to every node , for .
Definition 4.2 (Full In-Connectivity):
A legitimate node is fully in-connected with respect to a region if in the -graph there exists a directed path to from every node , for . 17 Since the -graph is a random graph, we can consider the probabilities of a node being fully out-or in-connected. For analysis purposes, we consider that probe legitimate node (node 0) placed at the origin of the coordinate system, i.e.,
. We then define and as the probability that node 0 is, respectively, fully out-and fully in-connected. These probabilities are a deterministic function of the densities and , and the area of region . Our goal is to characterize and .
B. Full Connectivity: Asymptotic Regime
In this section, we focus on the asymptotic behavior of secure connectivity as we increase the density of legitimate nodes. Specifically, for a fixed region of area and a fixed density of eavesdroppers, we would like to determine if by increasing , we can asymptotically achieve full in-and out-connectivity with probability one. 18 16 Specifically, the case of % = 0 brings the following mathematical simplifications. First, the iS -graph is completely independent of channel gain function g(r); thus, no assumptions about the propagation model are needed. Second, there exist simple (often closed form) expressions for characterizing local connectivity [31] which will be useful in analyzing full connectivity. 17 Note that these two definitions imply that legitimate nodes outside the region R can act as relays between legitimate nodes inside R. Essentially, we are considering the iS -graph defined on the infinite plane, but are only interested in the full connectivity of the nodes inside an observation region R. In this paper, we will refer to this as the observation model. In the literature, other models for finite networks include 1) the restriction model, where the network graph is strictly limited to a finite square, with no nodes outside the square (e.g., [40] ), and 2) the toroidal model, where the network graph is defined over a torus (e.g., [41] ). The main advantage of the observation and toroidal models is their homogeneity, since they eliminate boundary effects associated with the restriction model, leading to mathematically more elegant results. 18 We say that an event occurs "asymptotically almost surely" (a.a.s.) if its probability approaches one as ! 1. Fig. 7 . Auxiliary diagrams for proving that lim p = 1.
Definition 4.3 (Asymptotic Out-Connectivity): A legitimate node
is asymptotically out-connected with respect to a region with area if , for any and .
Definition 4.4 (Asymptotic In-Connectivity): A legitimate node
is asymptotically in-connected with respect to a region with area if , for any and . 19 The following theorem characterizes the asymptotic out-connectivity in the -graph. Proof: Without loss of generality, consider that a legitimate node is placed at the origin, and let the region be a square of size containing at the origin. Let us partition into equal subsquares of size , where is the smallest number such that the total number of subsquares is an integer. 20 This partition is depicted in Fig. 7(a) . A subsquare is said to be full if it contains at least one legitimate node, and empty otherwise. The probability that a subsquare is full is , and the probability that every subsquare of is full is (27) where we used the fact that is a Poisson process. When we take the limit , it is easy to see that and that (27) converges to one. In other words, the described partition of ensures that every subsquare will be full a.a.s. Next, we analyze the secure connectivity between legitimate nodes belonging to adjacent subsquares of . Recall Fig. 3(b) , where and denote two adjacent squares. Using an argument analogous to Section III-D-I, we know that if the 7 8 subsquare rectangle [ in Fig. 3(b) ] is free of eavesdroppers, then all legitimate nodes inside form a single strong component. 21 Now consider a region constructed in the following way. For every possible pair of adjacent subsquares in , determine whether the associated rectangle is free of eavesdroppers. If so, update such that it now becomes . Repeat the process until there are no more pairs of adjacent subsquares. With this definition, it is possible for large enough to partition the square into two regions as where is simply the remaining region of after is constructed as previously. This partition is shown in Fig. 7(a) . By construction, it is easy to see that as approaches infinity (or, equivalently, the size of the subsquares approaches zero) the following properties hold a.s.
1) The region can be decomposed into nonoverlapping regions as , where is the number of eavesdroppers inside , and is a square of size 7 7 subsquares centered at the th eavesdropper of . If , then .
2) The origin belongs to . 3) There exists a lattice path (i.e., a path composed only of horizontal and vertical segments inside ) between every two subsquares of , and thus, all legitimate nodes inside form a single strong component. We thus conclude that the origin is a.a.s. out-connected to all legitimate nodes inside . It remains to be determined whether it is also out-connected to all legitimate nodes inside . For that purpose, we consider the behavior of the -graph in the vicinity of the th eavesdropper of , which we denote by . 22 We know that a node will be in-connected iff the corresponding Voronoi cell induced by the process has at least another legitimate node [31] . A little reflection shows that as , this Voronoi cell approaches the half-plane as depicted in Fig. 7(b) . Now, it is easy to see that for every , there is a.a.s. at least one legitimate node inside the region , and thus, every such node has an in-connection from the strong component in . This argument holds similarly for every region , , and so we conclude that the origin is a.a.s. out-connected to all legitimate nodes inside , in addition to those in .
The following theorem characterizes the asymptotic in-connectivity in the -graph. 
i.e., the legitimate node at the origin is not asymptotically in-connected. Proof: Consider a region with area , where a probe legitimate node (node 0) is placed at the origin. Let and denote the number of nodes in and , respectively. Consider the event that there is at least one eavesdropper and one legitimate node in region , as depicted in Fig. 8 . Let denote the distance between a arbitrarily selected eavesdropper and its closest legitimate node , i.e., . In addition, let be the set of possible locations in where a node can connect to , given that is the closest legitimate node to , i.e.,
. If there are no legitimate nodes inside , then is out-isolated, and the origin is not fully in-connected. Thus, we can write (29) In the limit of , the event occurs a.s., and the RV becomes exponentially distributed with rate leading to With this result, (29) becomes (28) .
The theorem has the following intuitive explanation. Consider (or ) large enough that border effects can be ignored. Given that exactly one eavesdropper occurs inside region , there is a constant probability that the legitimate node closest to the eavesdropper is outisolated, and this probability does not decrease with . In fact, when increased, the area of decreases in such a way that remains constant. As a result, regardless of how large is made, there is a constant probability of that the nearest node is out-isolated, and therefore, a positive probability that the origin is not in-connected. Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 clearly show that increasing the density of legitimate nodes is an effective way to improve the full out-connectivity, in the sense that the corresponding probability approaches one. However, the probability of full in-connectivity cannot be made arbitrarily close to one by increasing . In essence, full (in or out) connectivity is determined by the behavior of the legitimate nodes in the vicinity of the eavesdroppers. It is more likely that a legitimate node in such vicinity is locally in-connected than out-connected [31, Property 3.2] , which is reflected in the fact that the origin achieves full out-connectivity a.a.s., but not full in-connectivity. Operationally, this means a node can a.a.s. transmit secret messages to all the nodes in a finite region , but cannot a.a.s. receive secret messages from all the nodes in .
C. Full Connectivity: Finite Regime
We now attempt to characterize full connectivity for a finite density of legitimate nodes. We start with the simple observation that if node 0 is fully out-connected, then there are no in-isolated nodes in . Then, we immediately obtain an upper bound for as (30) We would like to express the right-hand side in terms of the individual in-isolation probability determined in [31, eq. 9] . In general, this is nontrivial because the in-isolation events for different nodes are statistically dependent. For example, if legitimate node is in-isolated and node is close to , then it is most likely that is also in-isolated. Full connectivity has been previously studied in the case of the Poisson Boolean model for unsecured wireless networks. 23 For such scenario, it has been shown in [36] , [55] , and [56] that as the average node degree becomes large, two phenomena are observed: 1) the isolation events for different nodes become almost independent; and 2)
, i.e., a bound analogous to (30) becomes tight. These two facts imply that for the Poisson Boolean model, the is both a simple and accurate analytical approximation for , when . We now investigate under which conditions similar phenomena occur in the -graph. For that purpose, we introduce the following definition: 23 The Poisson Boolean model is an undirected model where each node can establish wireless links to all nodes within a fixed connectivity range r , but to no other. (31) where is the random number of legitimate nodes inside the region (excluding the probe node at the origin). The quantity represents the probability that none of the legitimate nodes are in-isolated, under the approximation that the in-isolation events are independent and have the same probability given in [31, eq. 9]. As we will show later, this quantity can serve as a good approximation of , with the advantage that it only depends on local characteristics (the isolation probabilities) of the -graph and is analytically tractable. This can be shown by rewriting (31) as (32) where is the (random) area of a typical Voronoi cell induced by a unit-density Poisson process. Here, we used the expression for in [31, eq. 9 ]. For the case of full in-connectivity, we can proceed in a completely analogous way to write (33) and (34) where we used the expression for in [31, eq. 14] . Furthermore, according to [31, Property 3.2], we know that for and , and therefore
As a result, in the regime where and closely approximate and , respectively, will be typically larger than . Intuitively, it is easier for an individual node to be locally in-connected than out-connected, and this fact is reflected in the global connectivity properties of the -graph, in the sense that it is easier for the origin to be fully out-connected (reach all nodes) than fully in-connected (be reached by all nodes).
D. Simulation Results
In this section, we use Monte Carlo simulations to determine under which conditions and can be accurately approximated by and , respectively. Fig. 9 considers full out-connectivity, comparing three different probabilities as a function of and . 1) The simulated , which is an upper bound for as given in (30) .
2) The analytical
, whose expression is given in (32) . 3) The simulated probability of full out-connectivity, . From the plots, we observe that the analytical curve approximates surprisingly well for all and , considering the strong approximations associated with . Furthermore, the approximation becomes tight in the extreme ranges where or (i.e., ). This corresponds to the regime where it is desirable to operate the network in practice, in the sense that secure out-connectivity is achieved with probability very close to one. Fig. 10 is analogous to Fig. 9 , but for the case of full in-connectivity. It compares , , and , as a function of and . We observe that the approximation of by becomes tight when (i.e., ), but not when , unlike what happens for full out-connectivity. Also, note that the curves decrease with : this is due to the same phenomenon illustrated in Fig. 8 , whereby adding more legitimate nodes just increases the chance that some of them will be out-isolated. In general, based on the simulations, we conclude that and are fairly good approximations for the corresponding probabilities of full connectivity, for a wide range of parameters. The main advantage is that and only depend on the local characterization of the network, namely on the isolation probabilities, and thus lead to simple analytical expressions which can be used to infer about the global behavior of the network. In particular, they are simple enough to be used in first-order dimensioning of the system, providing the network designer with valuable insights on how and vary with the parameters , , and .
V. CONCLUSION
The -graph captures the connections that can be established with MSR exceeding a threshold , in large-scale networks. In [31] and [32] , we characterized the local properties of the -graph, including the degrees and MSR of a typical node with respect to its neighbors. In this paper, we have built on that work and analyzed the global properties of the -graph, namely percolation on the infinite plane, and connectivity on a finite region. Interestingly, some local metrics such as the isolation probability, although quite simple to derive, provide insights into the more complex notion of global connectivity.
We first characterized percolation of the Poisson -graph on the infinite plane. We showed that each of the four components of the -graph (in, out, weak, and strong) experiences a phase transition at some nontrivial critical density of legitimate nodes. Operationally, this is important because it implies that long-range communication over multiple hops is still feasible when a secrecy constraint is present. We proved that percolation can occur for any prescribed infimum secrecy rate satisfying , as long as the density of legitimate nodes is made large enough. This implies that for unbounded path loss models, percolation can occur for any arbitrarily large secrecy requirement , while for bounded models the desired may be too high to allow percolation. Our results also show that as long as , percolation can be achieved even in cases where the eavesdroppers are arbitrarily dense, by making the density of legitimate nodes large enough.
Using Monte Carlo simulations, we obtained estimates for the critical densities . In the case of , for example, we estimated that if the density of eavesdroppers is larger than roughly 40% that of the legitimate nodes, long-range communication in the weak -graph is completely disrupted, in the sense that no infinite cluster arises. In the strong -graph, we estimated this fraction to be about 20%. For a larger secrecy requirement , an even more modest fraction of attackers is enough to disrupt the network.
Besides considering the existence of an unbounded component on the infinite plane, we also analyzed the existence of a fully-connected -graph on a finite region. Specifically, we characterized the asymptotic behavior of secure full connectivity for a large density of legitimate nodes. In particular, we showed approaches one as , and therefore, full out-connectivity can be improved as much as desired by deploying more legitimate nodes. Full in-connectivity, however, remains bounded away from one, regardless of how large is made. Operationally, this means a node can a.a.s. transmit secret messages to all the nodes in a finite region , but cannot a.s.s. receive secret messages from all the nodes in .
We derived simple expressions that closely approximate and for a finite density of legitimate nodes. The advantage of these approximate expressions is that they only depend on the local characterization of the network, namely on the isolation probabilities, and thus lead to simple analytical expressions which can be used to infer about the global behavior of the network. In particular, our expressions show that typically , i.e., it is easier for a node to be fully out-connected (reach all nodes) than fully in-connected (be reached by all nodes). Our expressions explicitly show that this fact can be directly explained in terms of the local connectivity: it is easier for an individual node to be locally in-connected than out-connected, and this is reflected in the behavior of global connectivity described previously. Using Monte Carlo simulations, we showed that the approximate expressions are surprisingly accurate for a wide range of densities and .
We are hopeful that further efforts in combining stochastic geometry with information-theoretic principles will lead to a more comprehensive treatment of wireless security.
APPENDIX PROOF OF LEMMA 3.3
Proof: In what follows, we use a coupling argument. For fixed parameters and , we begin with an -graph whose underlying process has density . We then thin this process by keeping each point of with probability where , such that when a point is removed, all its inand out-connections are also removed. Because of the thinning property [45, Sec. 5.1], the resulting process of legitimate nodes has density , and we have, therefore, obtained a valid new -graph , with the same parameters and as before. By construction, the two graphs and are coupled in such a way that . As a result, the event implies that , and it follows that .
